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Abstract 
The history of political thought in Southeast Asia has overwhelmingly focused on nationalism 
and socialism/Marxism. Little has been written about the fate of liberalism in the region. This is 
in stark contrast with the literature that in recent years has emerged on liberal political thought in 
South Asian and East Asian contexts. Seeking to make a Southeast Asian contribution to this 
literature, this article asks: Is there liberalism in Thailand? To answer the question, it surveys the 
existing literature on Thai political thought; outlines the history of the reproduction of the 
Western liberal canon in Thai translation; and takes stock of contemporary political debates. 
What does it find? First, that while one might find liberals in Thai history, there is no liberalism. 
Second, that serious intellectual engagement with liberal political thought occurs comparatively 
late and remains modest in Thailand, but that Thai politics nevertheless has been stalked by the 
spectre of Rousseau for more than eight decades. Third, and finally, that some Thai intellectual 
historians and other writers have responded to the country’s recent political troubles – in the 
form of increasing political polarization, intractable and often violent conflict, two military 
coups, and the ill health and subsequent death of King Bhumibol – by laying the intellectual 
groundwork for a liberal form of Thai nationalism. 
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In the late 1800s, the German sociologist Werner Sombart asked a classic question of 
comparative historical sociology that has continued to generate debate ever since: Why is there 
no socialism in the United States? Likewise, in the early stages of the Cold War, when almost all 
Southeast Asian countries saw the eruption of Communist insurgencies, scholars sought to 
explain the exception of Thailand (Thompson and Adloff 1950). This essay addresses a similar 
kind of question, focused on another revolutionary ideology: liberalism. The conventional 
wisdom holds that, “In Southeast Asia, the influence of classical political liberalism is 
extraordinarily limited” (Rodan and Hughes 2014, p. 6) – and in this instance Thailand is no 
exception. Yet liberalism’s sorry fate in Southeast Asia has largely been taken for granted by 
scholars, with few puzzling over its causes or questioning its veracity.  
This essay proposes that it is time to reconsider this dismissive attitude towards 
liberalism. The history of liberal political thought in Asia has yet to be written, but important 
pieces to the puzzle have been put into place. To date, however, the endeavor has been focused 
squarely on South and East Asia (Bayly 2011; Nolte 1987; Fung 2008; Moon 2014), while 
Southeast Asia, except for the Philippines (Claudio 2017), has been overlooked. Consequently, 
there is an opportunity to contribute to this growing literature by recovering the history of 
liberalism in Southeast Asia. Even if the search for Southeast Asian liberalism in the end were to 
leave us with meagre rewards, the literature on liberalism in other parts of Asia suggests that the 
(relative) absence of a meaningful liberal tradition in Southeast Asia cannot be easily dismissed 
by a wave of the hand in the direction of colonialism and ostensibly Asian values. 
The main objective of this is essay is to add another piece to the jigsaw, by seeking to 
shed light on the fate of liberalism in one Southeast Asian country – Thailand (or Siam, as it was 
previously known). As a first step, it combs through the literature on Thai political thought. What 
  
 3 
evidence, if any, can we find of a liberal tradition therein? As a second step, the search moves 
beyond Thai thinkers. To what extent has liberalism been reproduced in Thailand through the 
translation and publication of works belonging to the Western liberal canon? As a third and final 
step, the search moves from the historical to the more recent past. To what extent has Thailand’s 
recent political experience – turbulent, conflict-ridden, and repressive as it is – stimulated Thai 
intellectuals to turn towards liberalism in their search for solutions to their country’s political 
woes? 
The inquiry proceeds based on a specific understanding of what liberalism means. The 
approach taken here is sociologically inspired, and defines liberalism as a tradition that is 
constituted by the classification of prominent ideological entrepreneurs – and the arguments 
associated with them – as liberal by many scholars of political thought.1 Using this definition, 
liberalism as a distinct ideological tradition is a product of the intellectual labour performed by 
scholars who do research into and write and teach about politics in general and political thought 
in particular. It is through precisely such a process that a shared understanding has emerged 
about who is to be considered part of the Western liberal canon, with thinkers such as John 
Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls widely recognized as icons of liberalism. 
While this essay thus has adopted a non-prescriptive definition of liberalism, it is of 
course true that scholars who work on political ideologies may conceptualize liberalism in 
(many) other ways. One such conception, falling short of a definition, will be useful to keep in 
                                                          
1 This formulation draws on a definition recently proposed by Duncan Bell, but relaxes some of 
its conditions: “the liberal tradition is constituted by the sum of the arguments that have been 
classified as liberal, and recognised as such by other self-proclaimed liberals, across time and 
space” (Bell 2014, pp. 689-690, emphasis in original). 
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mind as this essay progresses. Fawcett (2014, p. 10) conceives of liberalism as a “practice guided 
by four loose ideas.” Those ideas can be summarized as follows: conflict is inescapable and 
social harmony unachievable; resistance to power, which tends towards domination, is 
necessary; social change for the better, i.e., progress, is possible and desirable; and, finally, 
respect for the individual (Fawcett 2014, pp. 10-11). While each of these ideas may be shared 
with other ideologies, it is their combination that contrasts liberalism with its ideological rivals, 
with socialism and conservatism most prominent among them. 
While it would be an exaggeration to suggest that there is no liberalism to be found in 
Thailand, it is only a slight one. As I show in the next section, it accurately reflects the marginal 
position of liberalism in studies of Thai political thought and intellectual history. Whereas 
significant scholarly attention has been directed towards socialism and Marxism, on the one 
hand, and conservative “official” nationalism on the other hand, liberalism constitutes a virtually 
empty set in studies of Thai political thought. And as I then make clear, the introduction of 
Western liberal thought into Thai society was a much belated affair in world-historical 
perspective; it won few apparent major figures as converts; and has until recently attracted no 
serious scholarly attention. That is not to say that liberalism has no prospects in Thailand. As I 
note in the final empirical section, Thailand’s political crisis is, in large part, the result of a 
cultural and ideological impasse, and recent writings by Thai ideological entrepreneurs can be 
understood as part of an effort to develop liberal alternatives to conservative conceptions of 
Thainess and of the appropriate social and political order. The essay concludes with some 





Socialism and conservatism, but no liberalism 
This essay was stimulated in large part by the simple observation that the literature on modern 
political thought in Thailand seemed to be focused almost entirely on conservatism and 
socialism. Situating Siam in regional perspective, Anderson (1977, pp. 20-21) observed that 
while “most Southeast Asian countries have inherited a political vocabulary and rhetoric which 
is essentially radical-populist, if not left-wing, in character,” in Siam “[t]he prevailing rhetoric 
had typically been conservative, conformist and royalist.” Within the scholarly literature, we 
generally find Thai conservatism (anurakniyom) analyzed and critiqued under the rubrics of 
official or royalist nationalism (Anderson 1990; Murashima 1988; Thongchai 2001). In addition 
to conservative nationalism, scholars who have engaged in some fashion with Thai political 
thought and intellectual history have tended to direct their efforts towards the radical socialist 
tradition in Thailand (Reynolds 1994; Kasian 2001; Thongchai 2008). As one might expect, 
these two strands of intellectual history have established rival canons and figures of authority. 
Thus, Thai 20
th
 century intellectual history can be depicted as a battle between the hegemonic 
conservatism articulated by figures like King Vajiravudh and Kukrit Pramoj and the socialism-
inflected counter-hegemonic ideological challenge led by radicals like Pridi Phanomyong and 
Chit Phumisak. But what of liberalism? 
Anyone searching the library catalogues for major treatises on Thai liberalism does so in 
vain. True, one would have no trouble finding an important literature on concepts that often are 
thought of as closely related to liberalism. Most notably, scholars have explored the meaning and 
evolution of the concepts of freedom, liberty, and republicanism/democracy in the Thai context 
(Thanet 1998; Loos 1998; Jory 2015). But we do not find any clearly defined liberals therein, 
much less any liberalism. Moreover, in overviews of Thai political ideology we often find 
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democracy (prachathipatai) – rather than liberalism (seriniyom) – juxtaposed against 
conservative nationalism and its Marxist/socialist rival (Peleggi 2007, chapter 4). But 
“democracy” is not a distinct ideological tradition, and prachathipatai has of course proved 
sufficiently flexible to be incorporated within both socialist and conservative ideologies (in 
Thailand as elsewhere). Other liberal-sounding words like seriphap (freedom) and sitthi (right) 
have experienced similar ideological appropriation across the ideological spectrum. Thus, one 
must not assume that the mere use of words such as prachathipatai, seriphap, or sitthi in political 
discourse are reliable indicators of political liberalism. As informative as conceptual histories 
are, they do not, separately or collectively, provide us with an account of liberalism’s fate in 
modern Thailand. 
The marginalization of liberalism in the intellectual history of Thailand is strikingly 
evident in several recent contributions. For instance, in Sopha Chanamun’s (2007) study of how 
progressive intellectuals (panyachon huakaona) have viewed the Thai nation (chat thai) and how 
they have sought to challenge the mainstream (krasae lak) conservative notion of Thainess 
(khwam pen thai) one would naturally expect to find a discussion of the kingdom’s liberal 
tradition – if one was thought to exist. But it is not. In fact, a single progressive is categorized as 
a liberal: the writer, newspaper editor, and novelist Malai Chuphinit. All the other progressive 
intellectuals are categorized as socialists or Marxists.2 What these progressive intellectuals, 
including the lonely liberal, have in common, according to Sopha (2007, p. 60), is their 
                                                          
2 While he eventually ends up in the socialist/Marxist column, the early writings of Kulap 
Saipradit (i.e. around 1932) are identified by Sopha as examples of liberal thought. The other 
progressives profiled are Seni Saowaphong, Udom Sisuwan, Atsani Phonlachan, Supha 
Sirimanon, Pluang Wannasi, Thawip Woradilok, and Chit Phumisak. 
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opposition to authoritarian government in Thailand, to Western imperialism and neocolonialism 
both at home and in Indochina, and to establishment interpretations of Thai history. The reason 
why Malai, author of the novel Thung maharat, is considered a liberal is not entirely clear, but 
Sopha (2007, p. 48) mentions that his writings demonstrate little apparent influence of Marxist 
theorizing, that he was “polite and gentle,” and that he did not, unlike many of his fellow 
progressives, participate in public protests. It thus appears as if Malai’s ideological position as a 
liberal is defined in large part by the things that he does not do: adopt Marxisant vocabulary, 
behave rudely, and join the so-called peace revolt (kabot santiphap) in 1952. With Malai the 
exceptional liberal among Thai progressive intellectuals, Sopha (2007, p. 116) notes that, 
“progressive thought” by the late 1940s had become a euphemism for Marxism. 
Moving forward in time, Prajak Kongkirati (2015) has recently explored what he calls the 
“cultural politics” of the 1960s and 1970s, with a focus on the Thai student movement. Here one 
will occasionally encounter the ideological category liberalism, but it is never associated with 
any clearly identifiable political or intellectual protagonists. This is very much unlike the case for 
the representatives of the “old” and “new” Left, who take center stage in the narrative. 
Discussing the cultural afterlife of the student movement, Prajak notes that many of the 
ideologies that were popular during the heyday of the student movement in the 1970s have since 
faded or disappeared from view. The ideologies he has in mind are “socialism, communism, and 
liberalism (which has never had strong roots in Thai society)” (Prajak 2015, p. 255). 
In Saichon Sattayanurak’s magnum opus on the history of conservative nationalist 
thought in Thailand it is perhaps only to be expected that liberalism remains off center. Saichon 
(2014a; 2014b) traces the development of the Thainess discourse that became hegemonic in 
modern Thailand through a close analysis of the writings of the ten “fathers” of this ideological 
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complex. They are, in order of appearance: King Chulalongkorn, King Vajiravudh; Prince 
Damrong Ratchanuphap; Prince-Patriarch Vajiranana; Chaophraya Thammasakmontri (Sanan 
Thephatsadin na Ayutthaya); Luang Wichit Wathakan; Phraya Anuman Rajadhon; Prince Wan 
Waithayakon Worawan; Mom Ratchawong Kukrit Pramoj; and, finally, Sulak Sivaraksa. The 
nationalist writings of these gentlemen are responding to more or less vaguely perceived 
intellectual challenges from within and without, starting with the 1885 petition for government 
reform by Prince Prisdang and his associates, famously critiqued by King Chulalongkorn, and 
ending with the economic liberalism and rationalism of Puay Ungpakorn that Sulak Sivaraksa 
rapped as un-Thai.  
The illiberal position of these conservative intellectuals is readily apparent. To note just a 
few examples: Luang Wichit viewed nationalism as the very opposite of liberalism, which he 
associated with individualism, egoism, and growing class inequalities; Phraya Anuman 
considered the idea of human equality as no more than talk, and he argued that Thais already 
enjoyed freedom “in their hearts” and therefore had no reason to demand it; Kukrit viewed Thai-
style government centered on the king and the Buddhist conception of freedom as a spiritual 
matter superior to anything offered by Western-style liberal democracy; and Sulak, for his part, 
preferred rule by enlightened and moral elites – “good people” – over rule by the wealthy, 
greedy, and angry, which he saw as the inevitable outcome of Western-style liberal politics 
(Saichon 2014b, pp. 560-564).  
It is never entirely clear, however, whether the intellectuals perceived as challenging 
conservative conceptions of the appropriate political and social order – from Prince Prisdang to 




While Saichon’s ten panyachon have been chosen for their contributions to the 
development of conservative Thai nationalism, some seem to fit rather awkwardly in the 
conservative camp. This is particularly the case for Prince Wan. While his influence on Thai 
conservative thought, through his role in the modernization of the Thai political vocabulary, 
cannot be denied, the same can and has been said about Prince Wan’s influence on Marxist 
thought (Kasian 2001, pp. 196-198). Furthermore, many of his ideas about politics and Thai 
identity were never, as Saichon (2014b, p. 540) highlights, incorporated into the conservative 
mainstream. Prince Wan’s ideas about social equality and human dignity were simply too liberal. 
As we shall see soon, Prince Wan also played a pivotal role in the introduction of 
Western liberal thought in Siam in the 1930s. But here I should like to highlight that one of 
Prince Wan’s young proteges, Chinda Phanthumchinda, wrote a 1938 book entitled 
Thammachariya-prachakhom: seriphap somoephap pharadonphap (Social morality: freedom, 
equality, fraternity) which, according to Suphachai Suphaphon (2013), contained liberal answers 
to basic political questions. It emphasized in particular the importance of the consent of the 
governed and individual freedom (Suphachai 2013, p. 181-184). This may in fact be the first 
major liberal tract written by a Thai author. If so, the hitherto forgotten Chinda, a Roman 
Catholic who later would take the last name Chintanaseri (meaning “free will”) (Suphachai 2013, 
pp. 187, 193), might deserve more widespread recognition as a pioneering Siamese liberal. 
There is one important exception to the dearth of liberalism in studies of Thai political 
thought. Michael Connors has frequently deployed the category “liberalism” in his important 
contributions to the study of modern Thai politics. In short, he approaches the study of Thai 
democratization through a focus on an important discourse, unique to Thailand, that he labels 
“royal liberalism” (Connors 2008; 2012). However, this usage appears somewhat idiosyncratic. 
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The intellectuals that Connors (2008, p. 145) associate with this discourse, with Kukrit Pramoj 
most prominent among them, are more commonly considered spokespersons for the conservative 
tradition highlighted by Anderson. Among scholars of Thai political history, the package of ideas 
they represent are generally understood less as a form of liberalism and more as a conservative 
attempt to fashion a Thai-style alternative to liberalism (see, for instance, Hewison and Kengkij 
2010). As an ideological project, it has proven remarkably effective, as evidenced by the fact that 
the resultant liberalish monarchism on numerous occasions since the early 1970s has been found 
useful by forces opposed to dictatorships (military and parliamentary). The consequence has 
been a kind of ideological substitution effect: “no liberal-democratic nationalism developed [in 
Thailand] because the monarchical nationalism of King Bhumibol offered an alternative to the 
political nationalism of the military regimes” (Sturm 2006, p. 257). Thus, what Thailand got 
instead of liberalism was a new version of Thai conservatism which, at least occasionally, 
tolerated democratic forms and procedures such as elections and parliaments while continuing to 
reject fundamental liberal-democratic norms and values. To distinguish these “modernizers” of 
Thai conservatism from the purely reactionary, scholars have referred to this strand of 
conservatism by adding modifiers such as “progressive,” “creative,” and, indeed, “liberal” 
(Kershaw 1980; Zimmerman 1978, p. 65; Connors 2011, p. 668). Thus, there is no consensus in 
the scholarly literature that Connor’s “royal liberalism” is liberalism at all. 
The conclusion we may draw from the discussion so far, is that Thailand may have (a 
few) homegrown liberals, but it does not have liberalism. At least not in the same sense that it 
has socialism and conservatism. In the existing literature, both socialism and conservatism are 
easily recognizable intellectual currents (krasae) made up of successive generations of prominent 
ideological entrepreneurs. No equivalent exists for liberalism. However, in the process of 
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arriving at this conclusion, we have also identified several exceptional individuals, such as 
Prince Wan, Chinda Chintanaseri, Malai Chuphinit, and Puay Ungpakorn, who do not seem to 
belong in either the socialist or the conservative camp, and who might deserve to be considered 
as liberals. It is through the close study of the political thought of figures such as these that a 
liberal tradition might conceivably be unearthed in Thailand.3 
                                                          
3 I do not seek to deny that there are liberals in Thailand, if by that we simply mean persons who 
in some way or other think of or present themselves as liberals, or may be considered such by 
others. For instance, those who have voiced constitutional opposition to absolutism and 
dictatorship might be thought of as liberales in the original Spanish meaning of the term. Of 
course, civil society activists working on issues such as human rights may often be considered 
liberals in some sense (as they are in Bajpai and Bonura 2013). And there is no denying that 
Thailand’s Democrat Party is a member of the Liberal International (LI), and that party leader 
Abhisit Vejjajiva in 2016 was elected chair of the LI-associated Council of Asian Liberals and 
Democrats. Nevertheless, the Democrat Party has often been considered a conservative party 
with some (but limited) liberal tendencies (Sungsidh 1996; Tomsa 2017). Furthermore, many 
Thai governments have of course pursued economic policies that have been labelled, usually by 
their critics, as “neoliberal.” However, for the purposes of this essay, the question is not what 
international party group someone belongs or aspires to, what social and political issues they 
champion, or what economic policies they support. The critical question is whether scholars of 
political ideology classify such ideological entrepreneurs as liberal, and thus incorporate their 
writings into a Thai liberal canon. The advantage of this stricter conceptualization of liberalism 
is that it avoids some of the confusion that otherwise arises from the ubiquitous use of the word 




Liberalism in translation 
The study of the history of political thought in Thailand should of course pay attention also to 
patterns of importation, translation, and publication of political ideas and ideologies from abroad, 
and their subsequent role in political mobilization, contestation, and legitimation. As is now well 
understood, the development of the Thai socialist tradition was closely intertwined with the 
translation and publication of foreign ideological tracts (Kasian 2001). In contrast, Thai 
conservatism appears rather more parochial. At the very least, the international flow and 
circulation of ideas that has been so central to the development of Thai socialist thought has no 
real equivalent in Thai conservatism.4 What about liberalism? To address that question, one 
might, taking inspiration from Kasian (2001), ask to what extent, by whom, when, and why 
Western liberalism has been “commodified” in Thailand? Fortunately, recent research has begun 
to shed light on this hitherto otherwise unexplored aspect of Thailand’s intellectual history. 
The earliest instance of such commodification is to be found in Bangkok Recorder, a 
newspaper published in Bangkok by the US missionary Dan Beach Bradley from 1865 to 1867. 
According to one recent study, Bradley was the first to introduce “liberal concepts” to Siam, 
including “freedom, equality, constitutional and republican government, free press, liberal mind, 
and meritocracy” (Parkpume 2015, p. 21). These concepts were introduced in connection with 
“Bradley’s patriotic defense of American political values,” after Siamese nobles had expressed 
                                                          
4 Or to be more precise: the relevant ideas are less straightforwardly identifiable as political 
theory or ideology. For instance, Western ideas about religion and Buddhism have played a 




doubt about their superiority, in light of the American Civil War and the assassination of 
President Lincoln (Parkpume 2015, p. 27). Bradley’s writings frequently angered King Mongkut, 
and this may perhaps explain the brevity of the newspaper’s life. As it seized publication, a 
window into the Western liberal mind was closed. Bradley would, however, be followed later by 
other newspapermen who continued the task of making readers in Siam more familiar with 
foreign political concepts and ideas, such as Thienwan (Vella 1976). However, as members of 
Siam’s conservative elite feared that the genie of liberalism might escape into Siamese society, 
they tended to repress any such proto-liberal tendencies. The ban on Phraya Suriyanuwat’s study 
in political economy, Sapphasat, is instructive, as was the ban on economics that followed later 
(Chatthip 1978). That is not to say that there was no scope for ostensibly liberal concepts to enter 
the public sphere. Newspapers, whose owners and editors were often protected by 
extraterritoriality rights, could advocate for freedom of opinion and of the press, for instance, and 
discuss alternative political systems, including constitutional and parliamentary regimes. Sun 
Yat-Sen’s statist political thought appears, however, to have exercised considerably more 
influence in the era of the absolute monarchy than Western liberalism ever did, and particularly 
so after the 1911 republican revolution in China (Wasana 2011). 
It was only after 1932 that commodification of Western political thought on any larger 
scale became politically viable. The established literature on the 1932 revolution has tended to 
downplay the role and influence of Western liberal ideas (Nakharin 1992). Contrasting the 1932 
revolution with earlier revolutions in England, America, and France, Amon Raksasat (1972) 
notes that in all cases but the Siamese were the revolutions put in motion by the development of 
novel political ideas. But, he points out, “the revolution in Thailand did not begin from our own 
philosophers and borrowed only very little from European philosophy” (Amon 1972, p. 960). He 
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explains this as consequence of the absence, partly but not entirely the result of government 
repression, of a literary tradition of political fiction and non-fiction writing. 
Following the toppling of the absolute monarchy, however, new research suggests that 
more Western liberalism was brought to the marketplace of ideas than previously recognized. In 
a pioneering dissertation, Suphachai Suphapol (2013) argues that Rousseau’s writings played a 
particularly important role in the People Party’s efforts to establish political-theoretical 
foundations for the new democratic order’s central institutions – constitution, elections, and 
parliament. It was with this goal in mind that Prince Wan summarized Rousseau’s thoughts 
concerning the “general will” in Khumue rabop mai (Handbook for the new system), published 
in 1934 (Suphachai 2013, pp. 81-88). In short order thereafter, Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Political Economy, Emile, and The Social Contract were all published in Thai-language versions 
(Suphachai 2013, p. 292). The Discourse was translated by a collective known as Khana 
Yuwasan; Emile by Tiang Sirikhan (subsequently a prominent leader of the Free Thai movement 
and a socialist member of parliament from Isan); and The Social Contract, as compelling 
circumstantial evidence unearthed by Suphachai suggests, by a young Thammasat University 
student later known as Chinda Chintanaseri.5 In post-revolutionary Siam, Rousseau was thus 
cultivated as the foremost representative of the Western liberal tradition (Suphachai 2013, p. 
152). 
As far as we know, no other foreign theorist rivalled Rousseau’s standing in Siam after 
1932, but Thai intellectuals were certainly curious about Western political philosophy more 
broadly. Indeed, the newspaper Prachachat had been founded by Prince Wan for the purpose of 
introducing the Siamese public to liberal-democratic ideas, such as John Stuart Mill’s on 
                                                          
5 The Social Contract was published in instalments, now lost, in the newspaper Prachathipatai. 
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freedom of expression.6 And we find a portrait of Voltaire in the student journal Mahawithayalai 
in 1933 (Pusakon 1933).7 A textbook printed in 1935 introduced law students at the recently 
founded Thammasat University to the idea of the separation of powers, and in doing so cited 
Western authorities such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and John Locke (Suphaphon 2013, p. 103, 
159). In 1934, Outline of Great Books by J A Hammerton was probably translated into Thai 
(Suphaphon 2013, pp. 133-134). In addition to Rousseau – who received top billing, as indicated 
by newspaper advertisements offering readers a chance to pre-order the tome – the translation 
would have contained summaries of a number of classic Western works of political theory, 
including Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Politics, More’s Utopia, Hobbes’ Leviathan, Hume’s 
Essays, moral and political, and Paine’s The rights of man. While they are not mentioned in the 
advertisement, we do know that the original furthermore included summaries of works by a 
number of key figures in the Western liberal tradition, including John Locke, John Stuart Mill, 
Walter Bagehot, and Herbert Spencer. As the Thai translation cannot be located, we must 
surmise either that all original copies have been lost or that it never went to print, perhaps 
because there were too few pre-orders to make the publication financially viable. The latter 
scenario is probably the most likely,8 suggesting that demand for Western philosophizing 
remained limited also in post-revolutionary Siam. 
                                                          
6 The discussion of John Stuart Mill in Prachachat was subsequently referenced in a journal for 
university teachers. See Phrariamwirachaphak (1932). I am grateful to Akekalak Chaiyapumee 
for providing me with this citation. 
7 Thanks to Puli Fuwongcharoen for bringing this to my attention. 
8 Suphachai Suphaphol, personal communication, 14 February 2017. 
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While Rousseau is an example of a Western liberal thinker who is successfully 
commodified in Siam in the 1930s, he appears to be an exception. Demand for publications in 
the Anglo-American liberal tradition, such as those by John Stuart Mill, appears to have been 
effectively non-existent – not only in the 1930s but also for many decades thereafter. Given the 
Francophone orientation of many of the leading Siamese intellectuals of the 1930s, it is perhaps 
not entirely surprising that Anglo-American liberals had little natural appeal, but it is striking 
that thinkers like Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville made no discernible impact on 
Siamese political discourse in the immediate post-revolutionary period. 
As far as we can tell, Thai engagement with Western political thought is very limited in 
the period from 1947 to the early 1970s, with the notable exception of a boom in Marxist 
theorizing during a brief period of political liberalization in the late 1940s and early 1950s 
(Kasian 2001) (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Thai translations of major Western political theorists 
Year Author (Title)* 
1935 Jean Jacques Rousseau (Discourse on political economy) 
1936 Jean Jacques Rousseau (Emile; Social contract [no exact date of publication]) 
1937 Adolf Hitler (Mein Kampf) 
1948 Stalin (Problems of Leninism) 
1950 Stalin (Dialectical and historical materialism) 
1954 Engels (The origin of the family, private property and the state) 
1964 Plato (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo) 
1966 Isaiah Berlin (Two concepts of liberty) 
1971 Plato (Meno) 
1973 Plato (Symposium); Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince) 
1974 Thomas More (Utopia); Jean Jacques Rousseau (The social contract) 
1976 Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols, or, How to Philosophize with a Hammer)  
1979 Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America, vol 1) 
1980 Alexis de Tocqueville (Democracy in America, vol 2); Plato (Republic) 
1981 Plato (Euthyphro, Apology, Crito) 




John Stuart Mill (On liberty); Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay 
(The federalist papers) 
1990 Plato (Hippias major) 
1991 Plato (Charmides; Laches; Lysis) 
1993 Henry David Thoreau (Civil disobedience) 
1995 Niccolo Machiavelli (The Prince) 
1997 Friedrich Nietzsche (Thus spoke Zarathustra) 
1999 Karl Marx (Capital) 
2007 
Plato (The last days of Socrates [Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo]); Jean Jacques 
Rousseau (The social contract; Discourse on the arts and sciences; Discourse on the 
origin and basis of inequality among men) 
Note: *Authors widely recognized as belonging to the liberal canon have been highlighted in 
bold. 
Sources: Suphachai (2013); Kasian (2001); and author’s research. 
 
In the years leading up to the student-led revolt against the military dictatorship in 
October 1973 signs of an intellectual spring can be seen in the translation of politically “safe” 
texts by the ancient Greeks, especially Plato, and some careful attempts to introduce Western 
liberal thought to the Thai public. For instance, Isaiah Berlin’s 1958 lecture on “Two concepts of 
liberty” was translated by Sulak Sivaraksa in 1966 (see Sulak 1967, p. 140). A year later, Saneh 
Chamarik’s translation of M J Harman’s Political thought: From Plato to the present was 
published – the first (but not last) of its kind to be released in Thai. 
After the military regime was toppled in 1973, paving the way for a brief experiment in 
democracy and ideological liberalization, a leading student organization approached Chinda 
Chintanaseri and asked him to translate The Social Contract. He did so quickly, probably based 
on notes from the translation that he had produced for serialization in Prachathipatai newspaper 
almost 40 years earlier, and the book was released in 1974 (Suphachai 2013, pp. 172-175).  
Compared with the 1930s, the passion for Rousseau appears to have been less of an 
exception in the 1970s. The Social Contract finds company with More’s Utopia and 
Machiavelli’s The Prince (both translated by Sombat Chanthornwong, a student of the Straussian 
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political theorist Harry Jaffa). The first major work of 19th century liberalism to be made 
available to a broader Thai-language readership is Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in 
America, the two volumes of which were published in 1979 and 1980. The translator, Wiphawan 
Tuwayanon recalls that it was Saneh Chamarik who asked her to help translate the book from the 
original French sometime after the massacre at Thammasat University on 6 October 1976 had 
put a bloody end to the Bangkok spring.9  
From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s Thailand experienced an unprecedented economic 
boom which eventually paved the way for a return to full-blown democracy. It is perhaps not 
surprising that demand for liberalism in translation during this period reaches hitherto 
unprecedented levels, with key works by Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, Henry David Thoreau, 
and (again) Machiavelli being made available to Thai readers. 
During and following the Thaksin era, which began with a remarkable election victory in 
January 2001 and ended in a September 2006 military coup, Rousseau experienced a third Thai 
revival. It was initiated by Thaksin himself. During his graduate studies in Texas, he had been 
introduced to Western political philosophers such as Hobbes, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Locke 
(Thak 2007, p. 59). After his political triumph, however, it was with Rousseau above others that 
he sought to associate his political project (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, p. 99). Indeed, in 2005 he 
put Rousseau’s The Social Contract – as the sole representative of Western political theory – on 
his list of 109 books that he recommended all Thais to read (Banphitsanulok 2005). However, it 
was only after the military coup in September 2006, that the Rousseau renaissance is reflected in 
another round of commodification, with new translations of several of his key works, including, 
The Social Contract, appearing in 2007 (Suphachai 2013, p. 216). 
                                                          
9 Interview in Bangkok, 9 November 2016. 
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This quick survey of the history of the commodification of liberalism in Thailand reveals 
a number of interesting patterns. The first is immediately apparent: the extraordinary enthusiasm 
for Rousseau, and the striking lack of interest in the rest of the liberal canon. How might that be 
explained? In his dissertation, Suphachai attributes this to two main factors. The first is 
Rousseau’s rousing rhetoric, as reflected in the opening lines of The Social Contract: “Man is 
born free; and everywhere he is in chains. One thinks himself the master of others, and still 
remains a greater slave than they.” Particularly in the 1930s and 1970s, Rousseau’s rhetoric 
appealed to the poetic and romantic sensibilities of those who had sought to shake off their 
chains by overthrowing old regimes. The second, and related, reason is the unrivalled prestige 
and charisma that Rousseau’s name enjoyed because his work was understood to have served as 
the ideational driving force of the French Revolution. And that revolution was the world 
historical event above all others with which radical intellectuals wanted to associate the 
revolutions of 1932 and 1973 (Suphachai 2013, p. 238-239). Thaksin’s flirt with Rousseau must 
thus be understood not as something idiosyncratic, but rather in light of its historical antecedents. 
The invocation of Rousseau is a recurring trope in radical Thai political discourse. The 
connection thus forged between the Thaksin government and the 1973 revolution in particular 
was of course not only discursive, but were manifested also in his close links with a number of 
prominent former left-wing activists for whom October 1973 and October 1976 were formative 
political experiences (Kanokrat 2012). The decision to recruit Rousseau to the Thai Rak Thai 
party may thus be less a matter of Thaksin suddenly remembering his political theory classes at 
Sam Houston State University, and more a matter of Octobrists seizing the opportunity to recycle 
Rousseau as an instrument of political legitimation. 
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What Suphachai’s disertation also makes clear, however, is that Rousseau is a “dual use” 
weapon. Indeed, the 2007 translation of The Social Contract was published not only because of 
dissatisfaction with Chinda Chintanaseri’s translation from the 1970s, but more importantly to 
counter the perceived misuse of Rousseau by Thaksin and his supporters (Suphachai 2013, p. 
210-213). Parts of Suphachai’s dissertation also have a clear ideological ambition: namely, to 
show that Thaksin, the Red Shirts, and earlier generations of Thai radicals, had a superficial 
understanding of Rousseau’s political philosophy, and that they therefore misused his name and 
his ideas for purposes of political legitimation. What Suphachai does not recognize, however, are 
the historical antecedents of this kind of discursive move (i.e., to steal Rousseau’s thunder from 
those threatening the socio-cultural order). In the early 1980s, Thai military ideologues used 
Rousseau as their theoretical authority when they sought to downplay the role of elections in a 
democratic system and to assert, in effect, that the Thai monarchy and the military represented 
the “general will” of the Thai people better than a “parliamentary dictatorship” ever could (see 
Connors 2007, p. 108).  
In fact, this debate has echoes of a much earlier debate in the history of Western political 
thought, about whether Rousseau was a liberal or a totalitarian. At some point, however, 
arguments about who is the “true” heir of Rousseau in Thai politics risk becoming faintly 
ridiculous. Who truly understood what Rousseau had in mind when he published Du contrat 
social in 1762: the popularly elected Thaksin or the generals who staged the coups in 2006 and 
2014? Nevertheless, we can learn a lot about Thai intellectual history and Thai politics simply by 
paying close attention to when and how Western liberal theorists such as Rousseau have been 




The second interesting pattern is not immediately apparent, but rather require us to 
consider the Thai experience in comparative perspective. In world-historical perspective, 
Thailand’s engagement with Western liberal political thought occurs very late. The example of 
John Stuart Mill’s On liberty (1859) can illustrate. In Japan, “at least sixteen book-length 
translations of John Stuart Mill” appeared in the period from 1877 to 1895 (Godart 2015 p. 60), 
and On liberty was of course among them. A Chinese-language edition was published in 1903 
(Huang 2008). But it was only in 1987 that On liberty was distributed in Thai, by the National 
Research Council of Thailand (Mill 1987). What this suggests is that Siam/Thailand remained 
essentially ideologically self-sufficient for a much longer period than comparable Asian 
countries that avoided direct colonization. Why that should be the case remains to be explained. 
But it does reinforce the image, from the previous section, of liberalism’s shallow roots in 
Siamese soil. With a few important exceptions, Thai political and cultural elites did not seek to 
seriously engage with Western liberal thought for most of the 20th century, and they had little 
desire to see the Thai public at large do so. 
However, it should of course be recognized that the translation of liberalism may be an 
imperfect gauge of its influence. During the 20th century, an ever-growing circle of well-
educated Thais were able to consume Western political theorizing in English and French, should 
they so desire. And Thailand’s political and administrative elites could do so at least since the 
late 1800s, but we know very little about the influence, if any, of Western liberal thought on 
them. Who was Vajiravudh referring to when he assured his subjects that his ideas and policies 
were in perfect agreement with those of the most illustrious European philosophers of political 
science and law (Saichon 2014a, p. 197)? Is it an echo of the evolutionary theorist Herbert 
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Spencer’s maxim, “All evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions,” that 
we hear from the mouth of the king of Siam? 
 
Ripe for liberalism? 
The survey of Thai intellectual history that we have undertaken thus far has traced the rather thin 
roots of Thailand’s liberal tradition. But is liberalism’s stunted past also its future? On one level, 
the prospects for liberalism in Thailand seem bleak indeed. Since the 2014 coup, the ruling junta 
has set aside basic political liberties (freedom of speech, assembly, etc.) in the name of national 
security; the rule of man has replaced even the pretence of the rule of law; and civil society and 
the media have been severely circumscribed in their ability to hold political and economic elites 
to account. Furthermore, since the passing of King Bhumibol, Thailand has experienced the 
assertion of an even more aggressively conservative approach to the management of society by 
the junta and the palace. On the other hand, it is precisely this kind of reactionary overreach that 
is likely to trigger a liberal counter-reaction. The historical pattern is that public interest in 
radical and liberal political thought flourishes in the wake of periods of absolutist rule and 
arbitrary government (whether military or monarchical), and we may thus expect the same to 
happen if and when a civilian government returns to power in Bangkok. 
And we may not even have to wait for that. Developments leading up to and following 
the 2006 military coup have already convinced many Thai intellectuals that the modern Thai 
nation-state faces a seemingly intractable crisis of legitimacy, and that conservative efforts to 
restore national unity through insistent appeals to monarchy, Buddhism, and “Thai values” are 
failing. Thailand’s political crisis is thus fundamentally cultural and ideological. In short, it is a 
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crisis of the “traditional” form of Thai nationalism,10 and it is manifested in many of the signs of 
a “disintegrating nation-state” (Haas 2000, pp. 5-6). The search for new solutions to basic 
political problems accelerated even before the 2014 coup; and the junta that took power then has 
not succeeded in entirely killing the debate, despite imposing severe restrictions on the freedom 
of speech and of assembly. 
Indeed, the recent Thai-language contributions to the country’s intellectual history that I 
have cited in the previous sections are, as I may already have hinted, very much part of that 
search. In the pursuit of such an intellectual agenda, the first step has been to try to undermine 
the cultural symbols that have been used to perpetuate illiberal politics in Thailand over the past 
few decades. Thus it is that Prajak and Suphachai both seek to disarm rival partisans of their 
rhetorical weapons. In both cases the critical ammunition is aimed at concepts and phrases that 
rival camps have dug out from history and recycled (ad nauseam) as political slogans. Suphachai 
(2013) does so, as already mentioned, by trying to “set the record straight” on what Rousseau 
really thought about democracy. It is not, he argues, that democratically elected leaders are 
allowed to bulldoze liberal checks and balances in the name of sanya prachakhom (the social 
contract) and chetchamnong thuapai (the general will). Prajak (2015) does so by exposing the 
myth that democracy was a gift from King Prajadhipok to the Thai people that the People’s Party 
squandered and thereby forced his exile and eventual abdication. Prajak carefully traces how the 
                                                          
10 As Thongchai (2010) has noted, the dominant strategy of adapting Siam/Thailand to the 
modern world has been one of selective borrowing. The strategy has followed a dualist logic. 
Thailand’s ruling elites have been willing to import technology and formal institutions from 
abroad, but they have rejected liberal-democratic values as “foreign,” and as such fundamentally 
incompatible with Thai culture. 
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final sentence from Prajadhipok’s 1935 letter of abdication was turned into fighting words, 
animating the political struggles of student protesters in 1973 and more recently of the Yellow 
Shirt movement opposed to the Thaksin “regime.” The sentence in question goes as follows: “I 
am willing to surrender the powers I formerly exercised to the people as a whole, but I am not 
willing to turn them over to any individual or any group to use in an autocratic manner without 
heeding the voice of the people” (Batson 1974, pp. 101-102). These royal sentiments have since 
been turned against both military (Thanom) and parliamentary (Thaksin) “dictatorships” to great 
effect. But they rest, of course, on a myth that hides the fact that Prajadhipok’s disagreement 
with the 1932 revolutionaries concerned not the power of the people but rather the extent of his 
personal powers and prerogatives. To move forward politically, Prajak (2015, p. 269) argues, 
Thailand must find an alternative to this monarchy-centered democracy discourse.11 
While such critiques are necessary, it is of course also necessary to articulate alternatives. 
If mainstream conceptions of what Thai politics ought to look like no longer work, what should 
replace them? Providing answers to that question is the second step of the liberal agenda. 
Saichon is helpful in this regard as she seeks not only to identify what is wrong with mainstream 
Thai nationalism, but also to offer some new ways of thinking about what it might mean to be 
Thai in the 21
st
 century. In the conclusion to 10 panyachon sayam, Saichon thus argues that 
Thailand’s political conflicts can be managed and overcome only if the country can develop a 
                                                          
11 The juxtaposition of Rousseau and Prajadhipok points to an interesting parallel. Arguably, the 
frames derived from Rousseau and Prajadhipok have been used for similar purposes, besides 
firing up passionate crowds. Namely, to empower and legitimate the self-appointed true 
representatives of the Thai people. 
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new understanding of Thainess. While Saichon doesn’t explicitly label her alternative vision of 
khwam pen phonlameuang thai (Thai citizenship-ness) as such, it is at heart distinctly liberal (in 
the sense that it resonates with Fawcett’s conception of liberalism, mentioned in the 
introduction). Saichon (2014b, pp. 596-598) posits four main aspects to the cultural reform that 
Thais should engage in. First, it must be widely recognized that the mainstream conception of 
Thainess and of the nature of Thai society and culture have become obsolete. Furthermore, it 
must be recognized that there is a need to develop a new Thai culture in which it is understood 
that Thainess is not singular and monolithic, but rather allows for a plurality of perspectives and 
multiple “truths.” Saichon understands the resultant pluralism to be a source of political conflict, 
which cannot be overcome by appeals to samakkhi (unity). Instead, they demand the creation of 
political institutions that allow for peaceful bargaining and peaceful conflict resolution. Second, 
Saichon emphasizes the need to change and strengthen the culture of citizenship, putting greater 
emphasis on rights to equal protection under the law and the equal right and duty to hold state 
power accountable. Third, Saichon proposes that a new spiritual culture must be cultivated 
among the citizenry, making them accepting of differences of opinion, and giving them the 
courage to express their own opinions. Fourth, and finally, Saichon argues for a culture that is 
based on the recognition of the equality and the dignity of all humans. 
While this might seem like a tall order of cultural change, Saichon argues that her 
intellectual history of the making of Thai national identity shows that Thai panyachon in the past 
have been able to redefine the meaning of Thainess in response to changing international and 
domestic circumstances. So they should be prepared to tackle the contemporary challenge with 
optimism. But where to begin? And from what cultural raw materials might this reformed liberal 
Thai nationalism be constructed? Saichon preempts that question by recovering, from her history 
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of Thai nationalism, ideas and values that were articulated by “conservative” intellectuals as 
distinctly Thai, but which for historical reasons found no political favor and thus have been 
forgotten. Prominent among them are Prince Wan’s civic conception of the Thai nation 
(prachachat thai), defined by its citizens having itsara (liberty), as an alternative to the ethnic 
conception of the Thai nation that successive governments actually cultivated. Other examples 
include the principles of non-encroachment (khwamprat chak wihingsa) and clever coordination 
of benefits (khwamchalat nai kanprasanprayot) (Saichon 2014b, pp. 599-601). Given how 
common it is still today for conservatives to blame Thailand’s political woes on the excessive 
influence of Western liberalism, it may be a clever move to try to anchor distinctly liberal 
arguments in forgotten aspects of Thailand’s conservative tradition. 
The intellectual historians that I have highlighted here are of course far from alone in 
their efforts to fashion a more “liberal” political culture in Thailand. Scholars such as Kasian 
Tejapira, Thongchai Winichakul, and Somsak Jeamteerasakul are long-standing critics of 
Thailand’s “civic religion,” which has proven so amenable to the assertion of illiberal approaches 
to government (by civilian and military governments alike) (see Suphamit 2012). Members of 
the Nitirat group of legal scholars have articulated effective critiques of the conservative 
approach to law that are grounded – explicitly – in the liberal Enlightenment tradition (McCargo 
and Peeradej 2015). On the religious front, several public intellectuals have in recent years 
emerged as prominent advocates of the secularization of the Thai state, arguing that it would be 
better for both Thai democracy and for Buddhism if the sangha (the monastic order) were 
separated from the state.12  
                                                          
12 See for instance, Phiphat (2010), who cites John Stuart Mill extensively, and Vichak (2015). 
One of the most active advocates of a secular state is the religious scholar Suraphot Thaweesak, 
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It is quite possible, then, that future generations of intellectual historians interested in 
liberalism in Thailand may have good reason to pay particularly close attention to developments 
in Thai political thought during the first two decades of the 21
st
 century. It is in this sense that 
Thailand is now ripe for liberalism – not as the dominant ideology of government, but as a 
distinct ideological current (krasae) that should no longer be ignored. 
 
Conclusion 
The intellectual history of Southeast Asia in general and Thailand specifically has often been 
approached from the perspective of nationalism or Marxism/socialism. In contrast, liberalism, 
arguably the first modern political ideology (Alexander 2015), has been neglected. There are 
understandable historical reasons for this lack of scholarly interest. Liberalism has never been a 
serious contender for the position of either regional master ideology or leading counter-
hegemonic challenger. Nevertheless, as this essay hopes to have demonstrated, our 
understanding of the region’s past, present, and perhaps future would be enriched if we were to 
direct our scholarly energies towards a recovery of the history of liberal political thought and 
political philosophy in Southeast Asia. 
This essay has shown that while there are liberals in Thai history, there is no liberalism. 
This reflects a reluctance to pay systematic attention to ideological entrepreneurs with 
pronounced liberal inclinations. Among them, Prince Wan – should he be considered Thailand’s 
first liberal intellectual? – stands out as particularly worthy of attention. Indeed, it is quite 
                                                          
who is a frequent commentator on religiopolitical matters on social and mass media, and a 
regular contributor to Prachathai (http://prachatai.com/category/สุรพศ-ทวีศักดิ์). 
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remarkable that a political and intellectual biography of this man, whose considerable influence 
in Thai cultural life and international affairs spanned the 1932 and 1973 revolutions, has yet to 
be written (in Thai or English). 
The essay has also demonstrated the value of paying close attention to patterns of 
translation (and citation) of works by lauded liberal thinkers. While much more research on the 
topic is needed for a comprehensive picture to emerge, what we do know about the history of 
Thai-language commodification of foreign liberal thought has provided us with an index of the 
extent to which it has captured the imagination of Thai intellectuals and, perhaps, the wider 
public as well. As we have seen, liberals have in general not fared too well in this respect. But 
there are important exceptions. Indeed, a specter has stalked modern Siam – the specter of 
Rousseau. Further research along these lines is therefore surely warranted, in Thailand and 
beyond. A comparative question immediately suggests itself: How has Rousseau been received 
in other Southeast Asian societies, and with what consequences? 
Finally, this essay has highlighted how Thai cultural and intellectual historians and other 
writers have responded to Thailand’s troubled political circumstances since 2004 – defined by 
intense political polarization, intractable conflict, reactionary overreach, and the end the reign of 
King Bhumibol – by laying the ideological groundwork for the emergence of a liberal form of 
Thai nationalism. Irrespective of whether such an ideological project ultimately succeeds, future 
generations of intellectual historians working on liberal thought in Thailand are likely to find an 
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